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Interpretations of the significance of East Central European (ECE) alliances have 
changed over the past few decades reflecting, first and foremost, the degree of 
support for the European Union (EU) shown by Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Hungary – today often referred to as the Visegrád 4 (V4). During the post-
Communist transition period, subregional organisations such as the Visegrád union or 
the Central European Initiative (CEI) were discussed primarily within the context of the 
EU, framed by the widespread use of the slogan ‘Back to Europe’.1 In this narrative, 
subregional integration was pictured as a shared effort by former Eastern Bloc 
countries to align themselves with the advanced societies of Western Europe.2 Since 
the mid-2010s, by contrast, the Visegrád alliance has been reflected upon as a ‘special 
club’ kept together only by its members’ critical stance towards the EU. Particularly 
after the migration crisis of 2015, the V4 was depicted as a quarrelsome bunch of 
countries lacking plausible common interests.3 While historically the EU supported 
                                               
1 While EU documents and those of the East Central European organisations and states employ 
the term ‘regional’ for describing ECE cooperation, I intend to maintain the distinction used 
generally in this volume reflecting on the EU integration as ‘regional’ and ECE activities as 
‘subregional’. 
2 Mikko Lagerspetz, ‘Postsocialism as a Return: Notes on a Discursive Strategy’, East European 
Politics and Societies 13, no. 2 (1999): 377–90; Heather Grabbe and Kristy Hughes, ‘Central and 
Eastern European Views on EU Enlargement: Political Debates and Public Opinion’, in Karen 
Henderson (ed.), Back to Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 185–202. See also 
Martin Dangerfield, ‘V4: A New Brand for Europe? Ten Years of Post-Accession Regional 
Cooperation in Central Europe’, Poznan University of Economic Review 14, no. 4 (2014): 71–90.  
3 Benjamin Cunnigham, ‘Visegrad’s Illusory Union’, Politico (16 September 2016), available at 
https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-hungary-czech-republic-slovakia-visegrads-illusory-
union-bratislava-summit-eu-migration-orban-fico-sobotka-szydlo (accessed 30 October 2019); 
Robert Anderson, ‘Visegrad: Macron Plays Divide and Rule in Central Europe’, BNE – Intellinews 
(24 August 2017), available at https://www.intellinews.com/visegrad-macron-plays-divide-and-
rule-in-central-europe-127732/ (accessed 30 October 2019); Lili Bayer, ‘Unity of Central Europe’s 
Visegrad Group Under Strain’, Politico (31 August 2017), available at 
https://www.politico.eu/article/unity-of-central-europes-visegrad-group-under-strain/  
(accessed 30 October 2019).  
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subregional development as one of the key components of its cohesion policy, it 
seems that subregional integration might challenge the paramount goals of EU unity.4  
This chapter uses a different angle to evaluate the role and working mechanism 
of subregional entities, which in East Central Europe have an equally long, if not 
longer, history than other European regional ventures. It is therefore important to 
investigate what kind of relevance the legacy of the subregional option bares on the 
countries’ contemporary national and EU choices. This study claims that we need 
more research on the complex and simultaneous interaction of multiple levels: 
between the European and subregional spheres, between the subregional and 
national stages, and between the national and EU levels.  
Hence, our central questions are: How did the East Central European V4 states 
navigate between these different levels, and what was the main role of the 
subregional level in comparison to the European framework? What was the incentive 
to collaborate and what kind of institutions and modus operandi they created for that 
purpose? To answer these questions, the chapter will first take a look at the historical 
roots of ECE collaboration, then discuss how the legacy of past alliances can be seen 
in the post-communist drive to establish parallel organisations and why parallelism 
was necessary in the first place. Finally, it will analyse how the EU has reacted to 
subregional integration during and after the accession of the V4, and what kind of 
interactive dynamics the attitudes of the EU launched in the evolution of subregional 
affinity. 
The article makes three main arguments. First, subregionality, despite its 
transnational surface, actually emphasises the national agenda and turns it into a 
spatially extended transnational nationalism5. Second, the longue durée perspective 
reveals that subregionalism plays a central role in preserving sovereignty and integrity, 
which is why the ECE countries have been ready to recalibrate their national interests 
                                               
4 European Commission, ‘History of the Regional Policy’, available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/what/history/ (accessed 30 October 2019).  
5 See also for instance Riva Kastoryano, ‘Transnational Nationalism: Redefining Nation and 
Territory’, in Seyla Benhabib, Ian Shapiro and Danilo Petranovich (eds.), Identities, Affiliations 
and Allegiances (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Devashree Gupta, ‘Nationalism 
Across Borders; Transnational Nationalist Advocacy in the European Union’, Comparative 
European Politics, 6 (2008): 61–80. 
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in order to reach a common ground for the sake of subregional unity. Third, the most 
fluent and enduring collaboration has been achieved when subregional formations are 
historically rooted and emerged due to similar factors of development. 
The theoretical starting point is based on the claim that East Central Europe 
represents a double ‘in-between-ness’: an intersection of horizontal and vertical 
intermediary spaces. Horizontally, this area is situated at a crossroads where Eastern 
(mostly Russian) and Western (mostly German) influences have mixed and great 
power interests clashed over centuries.6 Vertically, the subregional level serves as a 
mediator between the national and external and/or supranational stages and has a 
profound impact on how the national and international spheres interact with each 
other. I argue that horizontal in-between-ness creates the spatial context for the 
subregional actors to organise, establish institutions, invent short-term strategies and 
generate long-term plans. However, the vertical in-between-ness provides the 
ultimate means to transform horizontal geopolitical limitations into leverage. The 
shared experience of navigating between this double orientation created common 
discourses and policy practices through which the regional actors emphasised either 
normative-formal connections (such as institutional linkages and formal networks) or 
symbolic-informal relatedness (such as ideological-cultural affinity, memories, public 
consciousness).7  
The in-between phenomenon, however, is not only a matter of how the 
countries formulate their alliances but also how it affects domestic politics and 
profound societal choices. Incentives to collaborate came from common concerns 
over security, economic necessity and societal development.  
 
Power of Historical Experience 
 
By exploring subregional formations over the longue durée, what emerges is a highly 
interesting pattern where two trends run parallel most of the time. On the one hand, 
                                               
6 Jenö Szûcs, Vázlat Európa három regiójáról (Budapest: Magvetö, 1983); Balázs Trencsényi, 
‘Central Europe’, in Diana Mishkova and B. Trencsényi (eds.), European Regions and Boundaries: 
A Conceptula History (New York and Oxford: Berghan Books, 2017).  
7 József Benedek, ‘Régiók kialakulása és változása’, Tér és társadalom 24, no. 3 (2010): 193–201.  
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ideational deliberations sketched long-term development but these schemes never 
materialised. The realised integrative constructions, on the other hand, were 
pragmatic reactions to changes on the international arena. In both trends, three types 
of integration emerged: alliance, federative design, and development model. Alliances 
were immediate reactions to dramatic changes in the security environment and 
aspired to establish institutional structures, with formal and informal modus operandi. 
Federations represented a deeper level of cooperation, which evolved towards 
centralisation with one state in a leading position. It is seldom remembered, for 
example, that Austria in the 16th century originally offered a federative context for 
small nations seeking shelter from the Ottoman invasion. By the 17th century this 
federation transformed into the Habsburg Empire. Perhaps the most intensive and 
lasting integrative model occurred when collaboration was based on a shared idea of 
development. This type of ideational bond between the countries created a symbiotic 
collaboration that made institutional structures less important in steering or timing 
cooperation. There were also less incentive for the individual states to seek a central 
role. While alliances and federations relied on normative-formal settings, the common 
platform of development leaned on a more authentic association.     
Common interest towards subregionality emerged already in the Middle Ages. 
In 1335, the Polish King Casimir the Great, the Bohemian (Czech) King John Luxemburg 
and the Hungarian King Carl Robert met in the Hungarian royal palace, located at the 
time in Visegrád, to create a customs union to stand up against Austria’s staple rights 
that harmed these kingdoms’ Western trade. While this alliance was short-lived, it 
created an area specific model to seek security via cooperation against the changing 
geopolitical realities. The age of nationalism in the 19th century launched a renewed 
enthusiasm for small nations to fight against the imperial context. The federalisation 
of the Habsburg Empire, and its successor, Austro-Hungarian Dual monarchy (1867-
1918), was widely perceived as viable a framework. Hungarians such as Lajos Kossuth 
and Oszkár Jászi, Czechs like Thomas Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Benes, and Ignacy 
Jan Paderewsky from Poland, all proposed a New Central Europe.8 This idea 
                                               
8 Lajos Kossuth, ‘A Dunai Szövetség tervezete’, Magyar Elektronikus Könyvtár, 1 May 1862, 
available at http://mek.niif.hu/04800/04882/html/szabadku0178.html (accessed 30 October 
2019); Oszkár Jászi, ‘Magyarország jövöje és a dunai egyesült államok’ (Budapest 1918), Magyar 
 273 
simultaneously challenged Eastern autocracy, Western imperialism and both Eastern 
and Western Marxism, since these ideologies denied the paradigm of the nation-state. 
The First World War modified the international environment dramatically, and 
the disintegration of great empires gave way to new sovereign states in East Central 
Europe.9 The knowledge of being situated in a buffer zone between the Western 
powers and Soviet Russia had an impact on their conceptions of security. These new 
countries had to adjust national interest within the radically changed international 
context – defined by the war-winning powers who tended to favour collective 
security.10 Great powers were eager to offer various scenarios for subregional 
integration as a means of competing over the area. One such alliance was proposed 
by France seeking to increase influence in the region, which in the previous decades 
had been a target of both pan-Slavism (driven by Russia) and pan-Germanism. France 
put pressure on Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania to form the ‘Little Entente’, 
as a security alliance designed to prevent territorial revisions by war-losers Hungary 
and Bulgaria. The Little Entente would also provide a framework also for economic 
cooperation. French policy aimed to polarise Central Europe but the countries did not 
adapt to its vision of friends and foes. France needed Poland to create a strong Cordon 
Sanitaire (or buffer zone) against Soviet Russia but the French initiative failed to take 
into consideration that, for Poland, historical symbolic-informal relations bore more 
weight than formal-institutional advantages. Poland had territorial disputes with the 
Czechs but traditionally cordial relations with the Hungarians.11 Future President of 
Czechoslovakia, Edvard Beneš, in turn suggested a compromise, transforming the 
                                               
Elektronikus Könyvtár, available at http://mek.oszk.hu/09300/09364/09364.pdf (accessed 30 
October 2019); Thomas G. Masaryk, The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis 
(London: The Council of for the Study of International Relations, 1916); Thomas G. Masaryk, The 
New Europe. The Slav Standpoint (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1972); Eduard Benes and 
Jaroslav Paponsek, Gedanke und Tat: aus den Schriften und Reden (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 
1976); Eduard Benes, First Exposé in Year of Work (1919), 9–38. Hanna Marczewska-Zagdanska 
and Janina Dorosz, ‘Wilson - Paderewski - Masaryk: Their Visions of Independence and 
Conceptions of How to Organize Europe’, Acta Poloniae Historica 73 (1996): 55–69.  
9 Janos C. Andrew, East Central Europe in the Modern World. The Politics of the Borderlands from 
Pre- to Postcommunism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 411. 
10 Ibid., 100. 
11 Piotr Wandycz, ‘The Little Entente: Sixty Years Later’, The Slavonic and East European Review 
59, no. 4 (1981): 548–64. 
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Little Entente into a Central European league which included Poland, Bulgaria, Greece, 
the Baltic countries and Ukraine. The aim was to create a wider belt against Soviet 
Russia and Austrian, German and Hungarian revisionists.12  
French influence faded away by mid-1930s, even though it made efforts to 
develop the Little Entente institutionally by establishing a permanent secretariat in 
1932.13 With Germany rising in the west and Stalinist Russia strengthening in the east, 
in-between-ness became an increasingly topical question in East Central Europe to 
address the context of the times. Poland came up with a wide-ranging strategic 
concept – the Intermarium idea – which envisaged a broad coalition of Eastern 
European states reaching from Finland in the north to Greece in the south and with 
Poland at its centre. The coalition was supposed to strengthen the cumulative military 
capacity and geopolitical weight of small countries caught between the politically 
turbulent Soviet Union and the West.14  
Another scenario was initiated by Italy in 1937. The Third Europe concept 
included Poland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Italy – with double centres of 
Hungary and Poland – resulting in common border dividing the territory of 
Czechoslovakia.15 On the eve of the Nazi Anschluss the following March, it was obvious 
that Hitler would turn on Czechoslovakia – hence German influence had to be 
countered. This ‘horizontal axis’, as the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Galeazzo 
Ciano called it, would contain both German and Soviet expansion to East Central 
                                               
12 Eduard Benes, ‘The Little Entente’, Foreign Affairs 1, no. 1 (1922): 66–72.   
13 Pál Dunay, ‘Subregional Cooperation in East Central Europe: the Visegrád Group and the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement’, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 32, 
no. 1 (2003): 45–56, here 45.  
14 Piotr Cieplucha, ‘Prometeizm i koncepcja Międzymorza w praktyce polityczno-prawnej oraz 
dyplomacji II RP’, Studia Prawno-ekonomiczne 93 (2014): 39–55; Robert Istok, Irina Kozarova and 
Anna Polackova, ‘The Intermarium as a Polish Geopolitical Concept in History and in the Present’, 
Geopolitics (published online 6 December 2018) 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650045.2018.1551206 (accessed 30 October 
2019).  
15 Magda Ádám (ed.), Volume 2: A Müncheni szerzôdés létrejötte, document no. 17, in László 
Zsigmond (ed.), Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához, 1936- 1945 (Budapest: 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1962-1982).  
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Europe.16 Third Europe would further help Italy to strengthen its positions in the 
Berlin-Rome axis vis-à-vis Germany.17     
Interestingly, the drive for subregional integration during the interwar period 
took place at a time when the majority of these countries had just achieved 
independence. Yet, there appeared a seemingly mutual understanding that 
cooperation was inevitable for protecting sovereignty. Nevertheless, while there were 
numerous great power initiatives aiming to create and control sub-regional alliances, 
the ECE countries modified these scenarios for their own purposes. After the Second 
World War, the governing incentive for collaboration was to ensure economic 
prosperity and societal development, in contrast to the security-driven aims of the 
interwar years.  
The Cold War juxtaposition further revised the notion of regionality: the 
countries of East Central Europe were cut off from their Western counterparts and the 
communist order pushed the countries to a new orbit of development. Subregional 
collaboration was reorganised institutionally by the Moscow-led Eastern bloc ally 
system, which emphasised a centre-periphery structure in the beginning. The most 
important frameworks of formal cooperation were the multidimensional network of 
Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaties, the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) economic alliance and the security organisation of the Warsaw 
Pact. Since the ‘satellites’ were unable to change their geopolitical situation, they 
gradually developed survival strategies to come to terms with the status quo. A new 
opportunity opened up when the Stalinist development model, based on heavy 
industry and extensive economic growth, reached its dead end.18 Reform communism 
was a typical in-between invention of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland that relied 
                                               
16 Minutes of conversation between Prince Paul and Ciano, Mar. 25, 1937. Cited in J. B. Hoptner, 
Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 83. Also Malcolm 
Muggeridge, ed., Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938, entry March 9, 1938 (London: Dutton, 1952). 
17 Lajos Kerekes (ed.), Volume 1: A Berlin-Roma tengely kialakulása és Ausztria annexiója, 1936-
1938, documents no. 354, 357; Magda Ádám (ed.), Volume 2: A Müncheni szerzôdés létrejötte, 
documents no. 123, 115, 382, both in László Zsigmond (ed.), Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország 
külpolitikájához, 1936- 1945 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1962-1982). Jozef Beck, Final Report 
(New York: R. Speller, 1957), 143.  
18 Extensive growth is an economic model where the increase of industrial production is based 
on the quantitative extension of input of raw materials, energy and human workload.  
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on a market socialist model, blending Western elements with the Eastern system. It 
opened up the possibility for entrepreneurship, small scale private property, 
consumption-led industry and more liberal social atmosphere.19 This in-between 
development strengthened further in the 1970s due to the Helsinki process, which – 
by emphasising multilateralism after decades of superpower-led polarisation – helped 
the ECE countries to re-establish direct contacts with the West.20 This pragmatic 
attitude towards Western opportunities, lacking nearly all Marxist-Leninist ideological 
inclinations, bore a consequence on the reformers’ relations with the Kremlin. While 
the ECE states were unable to establish an independent coalition, they nevertheless 
allied unofficially to protect Western trade against the Russian aims of deepening 
CMEA integration.21  
Increasing interactions with the West stimulated dissidents’ discussions about 
the concept Third Europe as a development scenario. Prominent figures drawn from 
the Polish, Czech and Hungarian intelligentsia argued that the East Central Europeans 
were plain objects of history and simple pawns in the superpowers’ game, and that 
this shared experience had a devastating effect on people’s identity. The way out from 
this stalemate, it appeared, would be for geopolitical in-between-ness to grow into a 
new in-between political option, challenging both capitalism and state socialism. Third 
Europe would rely on civil society as the ultimate source of political power.22  
The historical examples discussed above show that the different integrative 
models overlapped and even evolved from one another, indicating that numerous 
                                               
19 Katalin Miklóssy, ‘Khrushchevism after Khrushchev: The Rise of National Interest in the Eastern 
Bloc’, in Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic (eds), Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government 
in the Soviet Union, 1953–1964 (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 150–170.  
20 Katalin Miklóssy, ‘The Helsinki Process and the Finnish Model from Small States’ Perspective: 
Hungarian and Romanian CSCE-Strategies in Comparison’, in Anders Blomqvist, Constantin 
Iordachi and Balázs Trencsényi (eds), Comparisons and Entanglements: Hungary and Romania 
beyond National Narratives (New York and London: Peter Lang, 2013), 485–514.  
21 Suvi Kansikas, Socialist Countries Face the European Community: Soviet Bloc Controversies over 
East-West Trade (New York – London: Peter Lang, 2014), also Kansikas, ‘Room to manouvre? 
National interests and coalition building in the CMEA, 1969-1974’, in Sari Autio-Sarasmo and 
Katalin Miklóssy (eds), Reassessing Cold War Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 
193-209.   
22 The idea was developed by dissident intellectuals Vaclav Havel in his Power of the Powerless 
(1978), György Konrád in his Antipolitics (1984), Milan Kundera in The Tragedy of Central Europe 
(1984) and Adam Michnik in his Letters from the Dansk Prison (1985).  
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alternatives were seen as available in any one period of time. Some of these plans 
remained unrealised while some were carried out, giving way again to new ideas for 
reinventing subregional collaborations in an indefinite cycle. The historical experience 
of enduring alliances indicated that the common stand helped to keep at bay the 
nearby great powers’ urge to extend influences over the territory. The image of a 
concerted group lent more weight to the international arena and expanded the 
individual countries’ elbowroom. Locating themselves between East and West 
provided manoeuvring potential.  
 
The Role of Parallel Subregional Organisations in European Integration 
 
The dramatical change in the international power equilibrium following the end of the 
Cold War influenced the political and economic choices of the ECE countries. Amid the 
nascent post-1989 environment, the common dilemmas of democratization and 
marketization intensified the push towards subregional cooperation. The main 
question confronting decision-makers was how to make the fastest transition from 
the Soviet-centred framework towards Western institutions. Collective action was 
deemed essential to helping further the prospects of EU membership because, as was 
widely perceived at the time, many in Western Europe were not overtly keen to start 
enlargement negotiations with the former Eastern bloc members. Only a few years 
prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall the then European Community (EC) had still 
supported the erosion of the Soviet system. And while diplomatic relations between 
the Community and the communist bloc had been put on a more constructive footing 
by June 1988 the subsequent collapse of the communist regimes still took the EC by 
surprise. Hence, the first discussions with the East Central European countries tended 
to centre on creating partnership agreements rather than opening up membership 
negotiations. Delaying accession therefore became a central tactic of the EC/EU over 
the coming decade, even if the stability of the region was considered vital. Attention 
was instead paid to ensuring that the large ECE market could become an economically 
reliable partner with which to trade; this in turn required a predictable, stable local 
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political context.23 Consequently, the EU established new instruments to confine these 
countries, most notably the Pologne-Hongrois Action pour la Reconstruction Economic 
(PHARE) programme, which was signed with Poland and Hungary in January 1990, and 
which in December 1991 led to a Partnership Agreement – a sort of two-step process 
later extended to other transitioning countries.24  
Despite being deferred in short-term, the EU membership nevertheless gave 
succour to democratisers in the East. It was the prospect of joining the EU, combined 
with the sense of needing to accelerate this accession process, which gave freh 
relevance to the Visegrad union, this time institutionalised in the form of the Visegrad 
Group or, more commonly, the V4. Its founding declaration was signed on 15 February 
1991 by prominent figures from the region, including Vaclav Havel (Czech and Slovak 
Republic), Lech Walesa (Poland) and József Antall (Hungary). As each of them made 
clear, the priorities of collaboration were to secure independence and assist in 
democratisation.25 While the largest portion of the declaration was concerned with 
the internal development of the V4, however, it became obvious that achieving the 
EU membership was the prime engine of collaboration. Interestingly, there was no 
reference to economic relations although the idea of a customs union emerged in the 
meeting.  
To this end, the former Eastern bloc countries would need a new solution for a 
common market to replace the CMEA, which was officially dissolved a few month later 
in June 1991. By December 1992, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) 
                                               
23 Agence Europe, Europe Daily Bulletin no. 4957, 17 February 1989, Historical Archives of the 
European Union, available at https://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/444512?item=AGE-557 (accessed 
30 March 2019); David Buchan, ‘EC Moves to Co-ordinate Policy on Eastern Europe’, Financial 
Times 25 April 1989. Karen E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe 
(Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 43–65.  
24 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on 
economic aid to certain countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, Publications Office of the EU, 
available at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/2f1d2bc5-9898-
4b73-b9dd-52efaaba3bde/language-en/format-PDF/source-search (accessed 30 October 2019).  
25 Visegrád Group, ‘Visegrad Declaration 1991: Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech 
and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving for 
European Integration’, available at http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-
declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412 (accessed 30 March 2019).  
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had therefore been established, with multiple purposes.26 In addition to creating a 
free trade zone among themselves, CEFTA would help to improve competitiveness vis-
à-vis Western Europe and demonstrate the ability of the ECE countries to cooperate. 
Hence, the initials CEFTA purposefully resembled those of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), which had promoted economic integration with non-Community 
Western European countries since the 1960s. In so doing, CEFTA sought to become 
the ‘Benelux of the East’.27 An equally important aim of CEFTA was to liberalise trade 
within the ECE region. This is why CEFTA was originally linked exclusively to the 
Visegrád Group and was founded on strict accession rules. In 1995, for example, the 
countries had to change CEFTA’s founding agreement in order to include Slovenia, 
which was then approaching the level of economic development as already seen by 
the V4. Later Romania and Bulgaria joined. CEFTA would also help to increase 
intraregional trade, despite the fact that after the EU’s Copenhagen summit in June 
1993 (more on which below) the attention of the ECE states focused almost exclusively 
on building economic relations with the EU as a main partner.28 In the 2000s, 
moreover, it became obvious that the CEFTA was a typical transition-arrangement: in 
a July 2003 meeting held in Bled on the eve of their accession to the EU, the members 
decided that CEFTA would automatically cease upon EU membership.29 Since CEFTA 
and free trade matters were separated institutionally from the V4 and functioned as 
a parallel organisation, Visegrád could focus on other topics of cooperation and thus 
continue to exist long after CEFTA had served its purpose.  
The above-mentioned Copenhagen summit transformed the inner dynamics of 
the ECE countries because, for the first time, EU leaders declared that the Visegrád 
Group could well become full members in the Union with corresponding access to the 
single market. This was soon followed by the association agreements signed during 
                                               
26 Central European Trade Agreement – Founding Document, 21 December 1992, available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070614090538/http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/
cefta.pdf (accessed 30 March 2019)  
27 Andrzej Rudka and Kálmán Mizsei, ‘The Fall of Trade in East Central Europe: Is CEFTA the right 
solution?’ Russian & East European Finance and Trade 30, no. 1 (1994): 6–31, here 18.  
28 Ibid., 6–31.  
29 Lajos Arday, ‘Közép-Európa és a Visegrádi Négyek’, International Relations Quarterly 6, no. 1 
(2015): 1–5. 
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the course of 1993 and 1994. The EU, however, did not give any specific date for 
starting concrete negotiations until 1997. This delay tactic was a game-changer for the 
Visegrád alliance, the culmination of which threw into question its political worth. For 
one, the V4 did not need group-effort anymore to improve visibility in the West. 
Moreover, cooperation relied on the willingness to compromise, which the 
deteriorating personal relations of leading figures made increasingly difficult. And the 
diverging orientation of the V4 was a clear sign that the countries were beginning to 
lose faith in the idea that V4 alliance would accelerate accession. The velvet divorce 
of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 put these countries into a further difficult 
position, which Poland and Hungary utilized to speed up their own accession 
procedures with the EU. Thus emerged a degree of competition over which country 
could possibly secure EU membership first. The Czech Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, 
stated that since his country was more advanced than the rest, it was able to join the 
EU any time by itself. Cordial relations with Germany were more important for the 
Czech Republic than the Visegrád Group.30 At about the same time, Poland started 
having problems with political instability and its attention turned from regional to 
domestic matters.31 Meanwhile, due to growing tensions with Hungary over minority 
issues, the Slovakian nationalist Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, oriented towards the 
Russian Federation, and away from regional collaboration. For their part, the 
Hungarians focused on the Balkans and simultaneously sought to improve their 
relations with Austria and Italy, both of which were members of the CEI.  
The CEI, a parallel institution to the Visegrád alliance and CEFTA, was originally 
a multilateral collaboration founded in November 1989 by Austria, Italy, Hungary and 
Yugoslavia.32 This foursome soon enlarged to include Czechoslovakia (1990) and 
Poland (1991), while Yugoslavia was suspended because of the ensuing succession 
wars. In the early 1990s, it was not yet evident that the CEI would struggle to develop 
                                               
30 Vaclav Klaus, ‘The Czech Republic and European Integration’, Perspectives, no. 2 (1994): 7–11. 
Also Milos Gregor and Alena Mackova, ‘Euroskpeticism the Czech Way: Analysis of Vaclav Klaus’ 
Speeches’, European Journal of Communication 30, no. 4 (2015): 404–17.  
31 Between 1992 and 1998 there were six consecutive administrations. 
32 Central European Initiative, ‘Central European Initiative 1989-2009 Years’, available at 
https://www.cei.int/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/booklet%20final%20low.pdf 
(accessed 30 March 2019).  
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into a more efficient organisation. Thus, it was a safety option should the V4 alliance 
have failed to meet expectations. The CEI resembled the interwar ‘horizontal axis’ idea 
and Italian aims to increase a presence in the Central European sphere to 
counterbalance Germany’s traditional interest. Austria, on the other hand, saw an 
opportunity to retrieve influence on what once was the Habsburg Empire. Along with 
these aspirations, Austria oriented towards the Visegrád Group but the V4 disagreed 
about whether to allow Austria to become a member. By 1996, the CEI expanded to 
include a further 17 countries – including the new post-Yugoslav countries, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. The CEI was a loose alliance with 
the task of easing the way towards Western institutions. Yet it could never agree upon 
any common political programme or institutional infrastructure. Rather, it remained a 
forum of exchanging ideas about current political and economic problems. By 1997, 
the CEI was largely redundant from the East Central European perspective, partly 
because of the expansion towards areas that were not considered as benchmark 
countries for the V4.33 The CEI was also taken over by the EU in the following decade 
and turned into an instrument to deal with Eastern Partnership countries and EU 
candidate countries. Its purpose changed to strengthen democratisation in the 
Eastern neighbourhood by channelling funds and organising governmental 
meetings.34 Like the CEI, CEFTA was also losing significance as EU accession moved 
closer. And because of the improving prospect of EU entry, the V4 once again began 
to invest in the Visegrád alliance.  
This renewed appeal of Visegrad cooperation emerged towards the close of 
1998.35 Beyond the immediate prospect of joining the EU, several other factors helped 
ease V4 rapprochement. Personal changes were one: Klaus and Meciar had left office, 
and their successors put more weight on subregional cooperation.36 The Czech 
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economic leap had worn out too, questioning the viability of entering the EU alone. 
And the need to once again work together within the confines of the V4 seemed all 
the more important because in March 1999 the East Central European countries were 
set to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Seen in this light, Visegrád 
had the potential increasingly to turn into a security community. The Visegrad alliance 
thus met in October in Budapest and declared it was time to restart collaboration. Just 
over a year later, at a meeting in Bratislava, the countries also agreed that new content 
and ways of working were required to intensify their relations.37 Cooperation 
subsequently extended not only to security and the willingness to establish joint 
military-industrial production sectors but also to day-to-day issues such as traffic, 
communication, environment, and cultural and educational affairs. The new 
International Visegrád Fund would in turn help with exchanging ideas and integrating 
officials in the region.38 While this initiative resembled the EU’s principles of 
interaction and mobility, it nevertheless openly challenged the EU as it aimed to 
strengthen a subregional identity instead of an all-European one.  
 
‘Divide et impera’: EU’s stand on the V4 
 
Amid this context, the EU grew increasingly suspicious of the Visegrad’s subregional 
alliance. The Budapest and Bratislava meetings had both seen the revival of the idea 
that the V4 shared common interest, and this was likely to have a profound impact on 
the way in which they the EU as accession talks finally got underway. The EU was itself 
well aware that through concerted action the Visegrád countries might try to 
negotiate more favourable terms of entry. Despite its Copenhagen declaration having 
stated a desire to deal with the Visegrád Group ‘en bloc’, it thus now decided to keep 
the process strictly bilateral. This was confirmed by the European Commission’s 
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publication Agenda 2000 about the strategy of enlargement after the Luxemburg 
summit in 1997.39  
In the meantime, the Visegrád countries’ prime ministers met regularly between 
1998 and 1999.40 They were anxious to get the EU to announce the timetable for 
accession, which it finally did in March 1999 by proclaiming 2004 as the year of 
integration. The EU’s Enlargement Commissioner, Günter Verheugen, later presented 
a roadmap.41 Keeping the budget negotiations strictly on a bilateral basis and behind 
closed doors was an efficient tactic to play the V4 against each other. The common 
stand that had started to build in Budapest and Bratislava hence ended abruptly 
because EU support for the accession countries was understood as a zero-sum game, 
and each prime minister tried to squeeze out as much development aid as possible for 
their own country. The negotiation strategy of the EU, however, bore a counter-
productive consequence: while it indeed helped to downplay the common subregional 
stand, it also strengthened the national and even nationalist agenda.  
Before the accession, old and new ‘Europe’ clashed, which was a warning sign 
for the future unity of the EU. NATO membership increased the influence of the United 
States in Central Europe, and the V4 did not hesitate to show loyalty in 2003 by 
participating in the US mission in Iraq, irrespective of the fact that France and Germany 
refused to do so. The US State Secretary Donald Rumsfeld proclaimed the new NATO 
allies as ‘new Europe’ and claimed that the focal point of political power on the 
continent appeared to be moving from West to East.42 The French President, Jacques 
Chirac, became annoyed by Rumsfeld’s mockery and offended new EU candidates as 
                                               
39 European Commission, ‘Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union’, Bulletin of the 
European Union Supplement 5/97, available at 
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‘infantile’. He stated bluntly that newcomers ‘missed a good opportunity to keep 
quiet’ – which, unsurprisingly, poisoned the atmosphere still further.43 
French insults had another unintended impact on events. From the point of view 
of EU unity, the Visegrád countries decided to modernise their collaboration patterns, 
hoping to strengthen their common ground and better represent their interests within 
the EU. In May 2004, the V4 prime ministers met and stated that while accession to 
NATO and the EU were “historic milestones”, strengthening a regional or “Central 
European identity” was equally important.44 The streamlining of activities was, 
however, not regarded favourably in the EU. Chirac’s successor, Nicholas Sarkozy, 
warned the Visegrád countries that regular V4 meetings before EU summits were 
undesirable and “could raise questions” – ignoring of course that the French and 
German leaders also met regularly before EU summits.45 Yet another French president 
– Emmanuel Macron – made an attempt to undermine Visegrád unity, on the related 
matters of migrant workers in France and EU migration policy. On 23 August 2017, as 
a sign of his annoyance, Macron travelled to Salzburg to meet Czech Prime Minister 
Bohuslav Sobotka and his Slovak counterpart, Robert Fico, while leaving Poland and 
Hungary out. And when doing so he promised the Czechs tolerance with migrant 
quotas and, for the Slovaks, the opportunity to integrate them into the centre of EU 
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decision-making. Neither ‘sticks’, mentioned above, nor this ‘carrot’ policy worked in 
breaking up the V4. There was, after all, much more at stake.  
 
Streamlining Cooperation within the EU 
 
The original Visegrád alliance had as its goals the furthering of democratisation, 
economic development, and speeding up accession to the EU. These aims were 
achieved in 2004 but the alliance was still needed. A new strategy was established to 
defend V4 interests in two ways: on the one hand, it was deemed paramount to come 
up with constructive ideas in developing EU policy. On the other hand, it was equally 
important to become an equal member of the EU because, from the newcomers’ point 
of view, it was an upstairs-downstairs type of double-standard community. Soon after 
accession in May 2004, V4 prime ministers consequently defined as a new priority 
their active involvement in shaping further enlargement of the EU towards the east 
and south-east of the continent.46 It was clear that the V4 needed their own buffer 
zone in an area that was struck by decades of Yugoslavian war, violent nationalism, 
and an unpredictable Russia – all of which was in their vicinity. In the 2005 Budapest 
summit, the V4 launched Regional Partnership combining also Austria and Slovenia. 
The target of the partnership was stability and security in the Western Balkans. The 
Czech EU presidency in 2009 provided an opportunity to drive subregional aims in this 
respect. As Marek Neuman has pointed out, this was also a testing ground of what 
could be achieved by the Czechs with group-power behind them.47 Since the Czech 
Republic held the rotating presidency of the Visegrád Group between June 2007 to 
June 2008, its leadership consulted the V4 to formulate its intended agenda for the EU 
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presidency and get support on the EU level. The Czechs aimed to ‘streamline’ Visegrád 
cooperation, especially in relation to security in the wider regional context.48  
Within this environment, Poland became particularly active. Warsaw was for 
instance instrumental in designing a detailed policy agenda, the Eastern Partnership, 
which was an attempt to hinder Russian influence in the post-Soviet republics and 
create a buffer belt of sovereign states between Poland and Russia, realised with the 
help of the EU.49 The Eastern Partnership policy initiative was accepted by all V4 
members and in the process established a new way of working within the EU.50 This 
was a good example of how to upload subregionally important issues onto the EU 
decision-making agenda through joint action. The Eastern Partnership programme 
became a broadly supported EU policy, launched officially at the Prague summit in 
May 2009. The buffer-belt idea was closely related to the need to rethink security 
matters from subregional perspectives. The formation of the Visegrád Battle Group 
was raised already in 2009/10, but later in 2013 it was presented as the V4 
contribution to EU defence policy and in 2014 it was offered as a contribution to 
NATO.51   
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In addition to security matters, the economic realities of EU membership helped 
to intensity of V4 cooperation. As new comers, they realised that the EU’s single 
market was to open up only gradually and that mobility of their citizens would be 
restricted.52 Being ‘second class members’ obliged the V4 to develop a common 
strategy to pressure the EU to improve access to the Schengen area.53 The cohesion 
of the V4 grew gradually stronger in subsequent years, alongside the rise of their EU 
criticism.54 The first signs of dissatisfaction with the EU became evident in the 
European Parliament elections in 2009 and 2014, which saw considerable success for 
EU-sceptic parties in the region.55 In 2013, during the Polish Visegrád presidency, the 
V4 stressed that subregional cooperation was in fact the cornerstone of the European 
Union’s policymaking framework and they intended to strengthen their cooperation.56 
The Slovak Visegrád presidency in 2015 went further and underlined the importance 
of coordinating common positions in European affairs, under the motto ‘Dynamic 
Visegrád for Europe and Beyond’.57  
Growing criticism of the EU, articulated in these Visegrád documents, can also 
be seen in the revival of different scenarios for increasing subregional unity. The 
recycled in-between concepts re-emerged in new forms. The Three Seas Initiative 
(Trimarium), promoted by the Polish President Jerzy Duda in 2015, evoked the 
interwar Intermarium concept, although it has been argued that it was an 
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infrastructural and technological project aiming to modernise the EU’s eastern flank.58 
Trimarium delineates the geopolitical space between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic 
seas, and envisages cooperation among the Visegrád countries, the Baltic republics, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania and Austria.  
The affinity between the V4, and ensuing criticism of the EU, evolved most 
strongly however from the fact that similar national conservative political elites 
acquired power in these countries almost simultaneously. EU criticism also reflected 
an emerging new trend where the countries began to turn away from liberal 
democratic values.59 According to the annual reports of Freedom House on the state 
of democracy, it is obvious that EU membership did not strengthen democratic 
development in the Eastern European members. Between 2010 and 2020, the decline 
of democracy was noticeable in all Visegrád countries, especially in Hungary and 
Poland.60 According to Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the Visegrád Group 
represents an indigenous subregional development, which is more progressive than 
that of the Western countries because it is more open to other options.61 Orbán called 
for a strong Central European unity, basing its core on the solid alliance of Hungary 
and Poland.62 The migration crisis was a watershed moment in streamlining the 
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Visegrád Group’s collaboration and common stand. Finding solutions to the migration 
problems overshadowed all other policy areas in the V4 meetings and in Visegrád-EU 
relations since 2015, since migration was perceived primarily as a security-related 
matter and a breach of sovereignty. In June 2018, the Visegrád Group even held a 
summit with Austria and declared their intention to set up a new mechanism to 
protect their borders on the Western Balkans.63 Finally, the different standing within 
the EU was once again demonstrated in May 2019 when EU-sceptics parties 
performed well in the European Parliament elections of that year and received a clear 
majority of all votes cast in the V4 states.64 The growing influence of the Visegrád 
Group became apparent during the nomination procedure of the new head of the 
European Commission when the entire Spitzenkandidat concept was torpedoed by the 
V4.65   
The Visegrád alliance is an interesting phenomenon in itself. Institutional 
structures were kept intentionally weak because it was formed at a time when the 
goal of the EU membership was deemed more significant. Still, it has remained the 
most enduring collaboration pattern precisely because of its institutional flexibility. As 
an agile organisation devoid of complicated decision-making structures, it is to react 
relatively fast to changes in the international arena and, from time-to-time, open up 
to other regional actors in the vicinity like Austria, Italy, Slovenia, the Western Balkans 
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and Eastern Partnership countries. It seems that in international crisis situations, 
especially when sovereignty was felt threatened, the V4 states tend to intensify 
collaboration and are likely to seek a common stand. Due to its fluid structures, the 
Visegrád Group has been more than an ‘alliance’ but far less than a ‘federation’. Lately, 
though, there are strong signs that it is evolving into a unique development model: 
the Hungarian PM Orbán declared in December 2019 that it is time to build a new 




It has been argued elsewhere that transitional democracies are likely to form and/or 
join international organisations in order to further their democratic aims and that 
international organisations support this democratisation process.67 This article has 
claimed, however, that after 15 years of EU membership, institutional attachments 
have not brought the expected results of European integration or consolidated 
democracy. Subregionality, on the other hand, has become more important because 
it provides an intermediary level between the domestic sphere and the wider EU 
community. Intergovernmental subregional cooperation serves as a shield protecting 
the individual countries’ ability to drive national interest. This presupposes an ability 
to compromise and adjust national goals together.  
The convergences of the V4 countries’ policy choices are anchored in the 
common historical experience of the bipolar geopolitical space: they have been 
subjects to the same, sometimes rather dramatic changes in the international arena. 
In addition to these shared experiences, the contiguity of the countries equally 
matters because it reveals multiple political, economic and cultural interactions and 
interlinked development. Close connections made the consciousness of the shared 
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experience clearer, which eventually magnified the subregional angle. Hence, 
symbolic-informal relations played a more important role than institutional 
connectedness. This article further argued that, in contrast to mainstream literature, 
the East Central European countries did not go through profound changes after 1989. 
Instead, a core understanding of the need for their alliances emerged long before, 
rooted in the 19th century and still more so in the years following the First World War. 
Historical legacies can likewise be detected after the 1990s, when parallel cooperation 
patterns emerged as trying to find the best formation to drive common goals. While 
the combination of countries changed in various subregional organisations over the 
decades, the East Central European states nevertheless often returned to the basic 
unit of the Visegrád alliance. This subregional entity seems to provide multiple means 
to maintain sovereignty – especially by applying common development models – 
which makes stronger institutional structures all but unnecessary. 
 
 
